Alternative theories of wage determination and unemployment in LDCs: I. The labor turn-over model by Stiglitz, Joseph E.
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs 3.0 Licence. 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecornmons.0rg/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
.
 A n : 
5/1^/72 
Revised 9
1
/12/72 
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF WAGE DETERMINATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN L D.C "s :-
I, THE LABOR TURN-OVER MODEL* 
by 
Joseph E. Stiglitz 
U Introduction 
The problem of unemployment and underemployment in LD-CJ"® has long 
been a central concern of development economics, More recently, the dis= 
cussion has focussed on unemployment and underemployment in the urban sector„ 
The common diagnosis of the source of urban unemployment, particularly in 
economies such as those in East Africa where there does not seem to be "surplus 
labor" in the agricultural sector, is that there 
is a large wage differential between the urban and rural sectors which en= 
courages migration into the urban sectors, Andj, finally, there seems to be 
a consensus that the remedies for this--if it is impossible in fact to lower 
the urban wage to the level in the rural sector*=are (a) a wage subsidy, to 
encourage private employers to hire more laborers (use more labor intensive 
techniques)and (b) the use of a shadow price of labor for projects in the 
government sector which is lower than the market wage in the urban sector„ 
Although economists have advised governments all over the world to 
undertake these measures, they have based these policy prescriptions on 
partial equilibrium models which have not traced out the full implications 
of these policies; in particular, they have failed to take into account 
(a) the determination of the rate or level of unemployment in the economy and 
(b) the determination of wages in the urban sector,. The possible impli° 
cations of these failures may easily be seen. If the number of people in 
the urban sector is fixed, then hiring one person from the urban unemployed 
has a zero social cost, and the unemployment rate will be reduced
0
 If the 
unemployment rate in the urban sector is unchanged, at U , hiring one more 
person will lead to approximately U more unemployed people, so (1+U) 
17a 
people have joined the urban unemployed
c
 What the social cost is then 
depends on what they were doing before; if they were unemployed in the 
agricultural sector, then of course the social cost is still zero,, But 
if they were receiving the agricultural wage, and this was equal to their 
marginal product, then there is a significant social cost in excess of the 
1 
rural wage
t
 In between, there is the possibility that the number unemployed 
in the urban sector is constant, so that hiring one individual from the 
unemployment pool results in an in-migration to the urban sector of one 
person,, If he was employed in the agricultural sector, the opportunity 
cost is then just the rural marginal product of a laborer. Evidently, those 
who advocate using something like the rural wage as the shadow price of 
labor in the urban sector are making this assumptions but on no basis do 
they justify this assumption„ 
Similarly, one has to have a theory of the determination of the urban 
wage to know whether a wage subsidy will be "shifted" Evidently, roost 
of the advocates of wage subsidies not only believe that the urban wage is 
rigid downward, but that it is also rigid upward; yet even noncompetitive 
bargaining theories would suggest that some of the wage subsidy is absorbed 
by the workers in the form of higher nominal wages» If this is the case, 
a wage subsidy might exacerbate the unemployment problem by increasing the 
nominal differential between urban and rural wages, 
What is called for then is a simple general equilibrium model of a 
less developed country, explaining simultaneously the determination of 
wage differentials, urban unemployment, the allocation of labor between 
the urban and rural sectors, etc. This is the object of this paper. 
We call the model presented here the "labor turnover model" be-
cause of the central role that labor turnover plays in it. Turnover costs 
(hiring and training) are greater in the urban sector than in the rural. 
The turnover rate is a decreasing function of the wage rate in the urban 
sector relative to that in the rural sector); therefore it pays each com-
petitive firm in the urban sector to offer more than the rural wage. 
2 
Studies in Eastern Africa have stressed the importance of turnover 
in determining the structure of the labor market there, and it undoubtedly 
17a 
plays an important role in other areas as well. It should be emphasized, 
however, that in other economies, other factors may play a dominant role 
in determining urban wages. We have explored the policy implications of 
3 4 
some of the more important of these elsewhere. ' 
In this paper we contrast three equilibria: the competitive market 
equilibrium, the "second best" optimum where the government cannot control 
migration directly, but can control urban wages and employment, and the 
"third best" optimum where the government controls the urban sector only 
indirectly through wage subsidies and using shadow prices for public 
employment which differ from market prices. The "first best" solution, 
where the government controls migration directly, does not appear to be 
feasible without the government taking oppressive measures.
5
 The results 
of the analysis contradict much of the popular folklore on development. 
2. The Model 
(a) Wage Policy of the Individual Firm, Since the crucial way in which our 
model differs from earlier models of dual economies is in the determination 
of the wage rate in the urban sector, we begin our analysis with a discussion 
of firm behavior in the urban sector„ The representative firm produces 
output Q by means of a set of production processes which can be described 
by a production function of the form 
Q = F(K , L ) x
u u u 
with F
l l
 < 0 , 
where K and L are the capital and labor employed by the represen-
u u 
6 7 
tative urban firm. All labor is assumed to be homogeneous. 
Since our point here is the analysis of equilibrium positions, and 
not the dynamics by which they are reached, we shall assume the capital 
8 
stock is given* The firm wishes to maximize its profits; to do this it 
must minimize its labor costs. Labor costs consist of wage payments plus 
A 
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training and hiring costs. Included in the latter is the lost output (broken 
Machines, etc.) which inevitably results when a new employee is hired. 
The training-hiring costs per worker, T , are assumed for simplicity to 
be constant. Thus total training costs are a function of the rate of turn-
over of employees,, The. rate of turnover of employees is a function, in 
turn, of the wage paid by the firm, w^ , in comparison with (a) wages 
paid by other firms in the urban sector and (b) wages paid in the rural 
sector, w^ . It is also a function of the rate of unemployment, u „ 
If q is the quit rate, i.e,, the percentage of the labor force quitting 
at any time, 
q - q(w
u
/w
u
, w
u
/ w
r
, U) (i) 
where w^ is the average wage paid by all firms in the urban sector 
We assume that 
q
t
 < 0 , i = 1, 2, 3 . (2a) 
(Later, we shall need to impose some further weak restrictions on q .) 
The average period of employment is increased by (the quit rate is reduced 
by) an increase in the wage paid by this firm relative to other firms and 
relative to the rural sector, and by an increase in the unemployment rate, 
There are three sources of labor turnover (besides death and old age 
retirements): individuals quit to take other jobs in the urban sector, 
individuals quit to return to the rural sector^and individuals quit to 
seek other jobs in the urban sector, in the meantime joining the unemploy-
ment pool. The three arguments of our labor turnover function take account 
of these three alternative sources of labor turnover. In addition, the 
unemployment rate enters in still two further ways: 
(a) When an individual is hired by a new firm, there is some probability 
that it will turn out that he is unsuitable for the job (so will be 
fired) or that he will dislike the job (or the personnel associated 
with it) and therefore seek to find still another job. The ease with 
which this is accomplished depends on the unemployment rate. 
F5 
Much has been written in recent years on rural-urban migration. In 
31 
the African context, there is also an important urban-rural migration. 
Individuals leave the urban sector to return to their rural homes. They 
may subsequently return to the urban sector, after a period of work or 
leisure in the rural districts. The ease with which they can find em-
ployment whan they return to the urban sector depends on the unemploy= 
ment rate, and hence the attractiveness of leaving the urban sector 
for a respite in the rural depends on the unemployment rate. To take 
the extreme case, if there were no unemployment whenever they grew 
"tired" of the urban sector, they would quit, for they would know that 
as soon as they want an urban job once again, they could acquire one. 
The unemployment rate acts to discourage this rural-urban-rural remi-
gration. 
The firm's total labor costs then are 
w L + qTL = w*L m 
u u ^ u u u 
where w* is the total labor cost per employee. For a given L^ , the firm 
seeks to minimize the cost per employee; it takes the unemployment rate and 
the wage rate of other firms as given, and chooses w to minimize w + qT . 
13
 U U 
This yields the first order condition 
"
q
l .
 q
2 
The marginal savings in turnover costs must be equal to the extra wage costs, 
In Figure 1 we have depicted graphically the firm's choice of a 
wage rate for fixed unemployment rate U and given average wage rate in 
the urban sector, w^ , We have plotted two different quit rate functions, 
corresponding to different w . The firm chooses a "quit-rate-wage" com-
bination at a point such as E where the quit rate function is tangent 
to an iso-labor cost curve w^ + T£ , 
5a 
FIGURE i 
Firm's Choice of Optimal Wage Rate 
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Since we are assuming that all firms are identical, equilibrium 
in the urban labor market requires all firms pay the same wage 
w = w . (5) 
u u 
Substituting (5) into (4) we can solve for w as a function 
u 
of the parameters facing the urban sector, U and w^ , and training 
costs T (see Figure 2), 
w
u
 = 0(U, w
r
, T) . (6) 
Normally, we would expect anything that increased labor turnover 
costs to the firm at the old wages (i.e. increased training costs or 
quit rates) would lead firms to pay higher wages to offset partly these 
14 
increased turnover costs. Thus, we assume 
0
T
 >
 ° ' K
 >
 ° '
 0
U <
 0 ( 7 ) 
r 
that is, we Impose the following restrictions on our quit rate function 
(at the equilibrium)
1 5
'
1 6 , 1 7 
<12 + ^T q22 " ? > 0 <2b> 
r u 
<12
 +
 I T
 q
22
 +
 <*2 >
 0
 <
2 c
> 
r 
<13
 +
 ? <23 >
 0
 ' <
2 d
> 
r 
To see diagrammatically what these restrictions entail, observe 
that an increase in training costs will increase, at each value of w^ , 
the value of w^ chosen by the firm. Let ^(
w
u
>
 w
r
> U, T) represent 
the solution to (4) (i.e., solve (4) as a function of w , w^ , and U , 
and T ). If an increase in the wages paid by other firms leads the firm 
in question to raise its wages but less than proportionately, as depicted 
in Figure 1, then i|f will be upward sloping, and an increase in training 
costs will increase the equilibrium wage (the wage at which w
u
 = w
u
 for 
17a 
the representative firm) as depicted in Figure 2. Similarly, 
an increase in the unemployment rate reduces, at each w , the w 
u ' u 
chosen by the representative firm: the quit rate function moves "downward" 
in a reasonably uniform fashion so firms spend less on direct labor costs 
(wages) as well as on training. Similarly for a change in w . (See 3T 
Figure 3. 
The model of wage determination we have presented here 
is essentially one of monopolistic competition in the urban labor market. 
This can perhaps best be seen in Figure 4. Equilibrium requires w^ = w . 
Hence, as the urban wage rate changes, the only effect on quit rates is from 
the increase in urban-rural wage differentials. This generates the curve 
we have labelled QQ . Each firm, on the other hand, believes it can take 
some competitive advantage of the other firms by raising its wage relative 
to theirs. The quit function it perceives is steeper than QQ . (It is 
important to remember that this is still partial equilibrium analysis; 
throughout, and 0 are assumed given.) The equilibrium is at a point 
where the qq curve intersects the QQ curve and has a slope of unity. 
(b) Urban Employment. The firm chooses its employment level 
to maximize its profits. Letting the price of output be unity, then it
x o 
max F(K , L ) - w L - TqL = F - w*L .(8) 
^
 v
 u' a u u - u u u 
so that 
F
T
 - w + Tq - w* (9) 
L u ^ u 
the marginal productivity of labor is equal to the wage plus training 
costs. Because F
T T
 < 0 this can be inverted to solve for the demanc 
LL 
labor by the representative firm, as a function of w* : 
L = L
d
(w*; K ) (10) 
u u u u
 v 
where dL /dw* = 1/F
t t
 < 0
 s u' u LL 
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(c) Allocation of Labor between Urban and Rural Sector. If there are 
large differences in wage rates between the urban and rural sectors, 
labor will migrate from the rural to the urban sector. More individuals 
migrate than can find jobs; and it is this which leads to urban unemploy-
ment. The unemployment acts to discourage further migration. There will 
be then a relationship between the magnitude of wage differentials and 
the equilibrium rate of unemployment. The greater the wage differential, 
the greater the equilibrium level of unemployment. We write the rela-
tionship in the form 
? - - fe) © e > 0 . (11) 
19 
In certain circumstances, it can be shown that the "expected urban 
wage, " w^ , taking account of the expected duration of unemployment, is 
w
e
 = w (1-U) . 
u 
Hence in these circumstances if Individuals are risk neutral, and migrate 
to the point where the expected urban wage is equal to the rural wage, 
w
e
 = w (12) 
u r
 v 
then (11) takes on the special form of 
i r - i ^ u - < 1 3 ) 
r 
For most of our results, (13) is more restrictive than we need. 
>oth convenient 
restrictions on (11): 
20 
It is bo and reasonable, however, to impose the following 
<P (jZuJ (l-U) > 1 (11a) 
<p' > 1 . (lib) 
The first restriction says that (13) does not underestimate the wage 
differentials corresponding to any given level of unemployment, and the 
21 
second restriction says the same thing for changes in wage differentials* 
F5 
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Elsewhere, we have argued that the relevant rural w a g e — a t least 
in the East African context--for purposes of migration (labor turnover) 
is the value of the marginal productivity of labor. 
The production function in the rural sector is described by 
Q
r
 = G O C ^ L
r
, A) 
where A stands for Arable Land. Again, for our short run analysis, we 
shall assume that K and A are fixed. 
r 
There has been some controversy over whether an "open" economy or 
"closed" economy model is more appropriate to various developing countries. 
There seems to be some consensus that at least for most smaller African 
countries, the open economy model is more appropriate, and hence in the 
subsequent analysis we shall pursue its implications. However, the analysis 
may easily be modified for the closed economy situation. 
This assumption enables us to choose our units so that the price of 
output in both the rural and urban sectors is (constant at) unity. Then 
we write 
w
r
 = G
l
 . (14) 
r 
3. The Market Equilibrium 
The equilibrium of the economy is described by the wage determina-
tion equations for the urban and rural sectors, the labor allocation-mi-
gration equation, and the equilibrium condition 
L 
L + N = L + ,
 TT r u r I-U 
u
 L (15) 
where L is the total labor force, and N
u
 is the number of workers 
(employed and unemployed) in the urban sector: 
* ' h >
 ( 1 6 ) 
u 1-U 
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To see graphically the solution, we rewrite the first order condition 
(5), making use of the equilibrium condition (11) 
(17) 
Under the hypothesis introduced above ((2b) and (2d)) it is 
23 
easy to establish that 
h
8
(U) < 0 . (18) 
Then, from (12) we have 
„ _ h(U) 
r
 ©(l/l-U) <p(l/l-U) 
(19) 
and from (3) 
= h(U) + Tq(l, ®(1/1-U), U) » w*(U) (20) 
< 0 (20a) 
u 
dw* 
dU 
the rural wage and total unit labor costs in the urban sector may both 
be simply written as functions of U . For each value of U , then, we 
can calculate the demand for labor (using (10)). Since labor costs move 
inversely with respect to U , as U increases, demand for labor in the 
rural sector increases, urban employment increases, and urban unemployment 
increases. Equilibrium is the point where (15) is satisfied. See Figure 
5. 
Figure 6 may be used to give us some quick comparative static results: 
(a) An increase in the growth rate of urban employment which results in a lower value 
of w /w corresponding to any given U (or any other change having the same 
u r 

17a 
o / 
effect on qj ) raises the unemployment rate." (See Figure 6a.) 
(b) A labor augmenting invention in the rural sector lowers the unemploy-
25 
ment rate and the level of urban employment. (See Figure 6b.) (c) A 
26 
labor augmenting invention in the urban sector Ibwers the unemployment rate 
and the level of rural employment (raises the rural wage), (d) The effects 
of an increase in the capital stock in the rural and urban sector are the 
same as those discussed in (b) and (c). 
4. Optimal Allocation of Labor and Determination of Urban Wage Level 
The preceding section provided an endogenous theory of the determina-
tion of an equilibrium level of unemployment and wage differential between 
the urban and rural sectors. How does this equilibrium compare with that 
which would be generated by a government attempting to maximize the value 
of national output but which cannot control migration directly? 
The government's objective then is to maximize net national output 
Q + Q - TL q (21) 
subject to the labor allocation constraint (15) and the free migration 
equilibrium condition (11). Assume that the government directly controls 
the urban sector (but not the rural sector). Then it can "choose" L and 
u 
w^ . But rather than maximize (21) subject to the constraints (1) and 
(15) with respect to these variables, let us assume the government con-
trolled directly L and U , the unemploy-

17a 
merit rate. By solving this problem, there will emerge an equilibrium w_ , 
which, if the government set the wage at that level, would generate the in-
dicated level of unemployment. 
Hence our problem may be reformulated (assuming K^ , K^ , and A 
are fixed)» 
f
- (
L
 • V
 A
)
 + F(
V V -
 T<
* * (&)>
 u
) <
22
> 
which yields the first order conditions (after some simplification) 
(23) 
5(i=u)
 = f
L
 +
 •
 ( 2 4 ) 
(23), (24), and (15) describe the general equilibrium of the 
economy with the government controlled urban sector. We wish to compare 
this equilibrium with that for the market economy described by (4), 
(9) and (15): 
(a) The "shadow price of labor" in the urban sector is equal to ^SJo^) 
times the urban wage. (See (24) Thus, in the case of (13) (where the 
expected urban wage is equal to w
u
(l-U) , and migration continues until 
the expected urban wage is equal to the rural wage) the shadow price of 
labor is just the urban wage, even though there is unemployment. The reason 
for this is that at a fixed wage, when 100 additional workers are hired for 
the urban sector if the unemployment rate is say 5Z, 105 workers leave the 
rural sector. The opportunity cost of labor is less than the urban wage, 
but the induced unemployment just offsets this. Normally, cp/ J (1-U) 
is slightly greater than one, so that the induced unemployment for hiring 
one worker in the urban sector is smaller. For instance, if the unemployment 
17a 
rate is 20% when the urban rural wage ratio is 1.5, then the shadow price 
of labor is 5/6 the (optimally chosen) urban wage. 
(b) The market wage at any given level of unemployment may be greater 
27 28 
or smaller than the optimum wage in the urban sector: ' 
w
c
( U ) J w°( U ) as h
C
( U ) < h°(U ) (25) 
where h (U) is defined by (17) and 
A h"(U) = ~T (q
2
<p CD* + q
3
d>(l~U) > . (26) 
Competitive firms make three "mistakes" in calculating the effects 
of an increase in wages on labor turnover. First, they take the unemploy-
ment rate as given. But when all firms increase the wage rate, it increases 
the unemployment rate and hence lowers the turnover costs. Second, the 
competitive firms assume that w , the rural wage, is constant; hence a 
r 
given percentage increase in w^ is equivalent to the same percentage in-
crease in w /w . When all firms increase their wage§ however, the rural IX 3T 
wage does change. Moreover, we know that in equilibrium, increasing
 w
u
/
w
r 
much be accompanied by increasing unemployment; hence increasing unemploy-
ment has a secondary effect on turnover through increasing urban-rural wage 
differentials; this effect is larger the larger is . Third, each firm believes 
that it can get some competitive advantage relative to other firms in the 
urban sector in reducing labor turnover (due to movement of labor within 
the urban sector) by increasing Its wage relative to them (i.e. q^ was 
assumed to be negative). Obviously, when they all raise their wages together 
they obtain no competitive advantage over each other. Analytically, these 
three effects may be shown by rewriting (25) 
w°(U) J w ^ ( U ) as -(q
3
<p(l-U)
2
 + cpq
2
(cp* - 1)) J ^ . (25') 
The two terms on the left hand side of the inequality represent 
the first and second effects; the term on the right hand side of the in-
equality is the intra-urban competition effect. The first two effects 
mean that firms underestimate the efficacy of increasing wages in reduced 
29 
labor turnover; the third effect means that they overestimate it. 
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Normally, we would expect that the "intra-urban competition effect" 
is larger than the "unemployment" effect, so that firms are likely to 
pay too high wages. But it should be emphasized that it is possible 
that the competitive wage is too low. In the ensuing analysis, we 
shall follow the conventional presumption in calling the case where 
c o 
h (U) > h (U) the normal case. 
(c) In the normal case, the equilibrium unemployment rate is higher in 
the market equilibrium than in the optimal allocation. 
U° J U
C
 as h
C
(U) Jh°(U) . (27) 
To see this, we first calculate total labor costs 
w
w 
« w
u
 + Tq = h°(u) + Tq rp / , V j = w*°(U) (28) 
and 
w*°(U) J w*^(U) as h°(U) < h
C
(U) for any given U . 
o c 
Turning to Figure consider the case where h (U) < h (U) . 
We observe that since the optimal solution involves a lower w* at 
every U , it involves a higher L^ 
the N curve shifts to the left. Since w is lower at every U , 
u u 
is also lower, and L^ greater, shifting the L^ curve to the right. 
The net effect is to lower the unemployment rate. 
(d) In the normal case, the equilibrium wage rate is higher in the 
market equilibrium than in the optimal allocation. 
w° = h°(U°) J h
C
( U
C
) = as h°(U) J h
C
(U) . (29) 
There are two effects: at each unemployment level, the market wage is 
higher, but from (27), the unemployment rate is higher in the market 
equilibrium. (Recall that the higher the unemployment rate, the lower 
the wage.) (29) asserts that the first effect always dominates the 
second.-^® 
14a 
Comparison of "Optimum" and Market Equilibria 
17a 
(e) In the normal case urban employment is lower in the competitive 
31 
equilibrium than in the optimal allocation. 
J L° as h
C
( U ) J h°(U) . (30) 
(f) Even in the normal case, rural employment may be lower or greater 
in the competitive equilibrium than in the optimum. The ambiguity arises 
because although urban employment is lower, urban unemployment is higher. 
It is more likely that L^ will increase if the elasticity of demand 
for labor in the urban sector is large, so that a given increase in the 
32 
urban wage rate results in a large decrease in urban employment. 
An alternative way of seeing the difference between the optimal 
and competitive wage policies is an extension of the "monopolistic com-
petition" diagram used earlier. 
In Figure 8, we have drawn the training cost curve qT as a 
function of w^ , for given . The slope of the curve perceived 
by the firm differs from the actual slope for the reasons discussed 
c o 
earlier. If h (U) = h (U) the wage would be optimal. If, as we would 
c o expect, h (U) > h (U) the competitive wage is above the optimal level, 

16 
resulting in a higher level of unemployment, less employment in the urban 
sector, and a lower rate of turnover than is optimal. 
In Figure 8 we have also compared the competitive and optimum 
33 
equilibria, 
5. Wage Subsidies 
The government can induce competitive firms to behave optimally by 
imposing a hiring subsidy (paid for by, say, a profits tax) at a rate 
where the variables are evaluated at the optimum (24). There are, of 
course, obvious practical difficulties to giving a hiring subsidy, partic-
ularly in African economies. An individual may have, for instance, several 
names, and he could be "hired" and "fired" successively by the same firm. 
It is perhaps because of these practical difficulties that most 
economists have.advocated a wage subsidy rather than a hiring subsidy. 
In discussing the consequences of a. wage subsidy, we must specify 
(i) how the revenue for the wage subsidy is raised and (ii) what are the 
general equilibrium consequences both in the long run and in the short run 
of the wage subsidy-cum-tax system. It is in this respect that previous 
analyses recommending wage subsidy schemes have failed. 
More specifically, previous arguments for wage subsidies have been 
less than convincing for the two reasons already noted in the introduction. 
First, they have failed to take into account the migration which would be 
induced into the urban sector as a result of the increased employment in 
the urban sector; this leads to increased unemployment (even at a fixed 
unemployment rate)
0
 Secondly, they have implicitly assumed that there is 
a fixed real wage which will be unaffected by the wage subsidy, i,e,, 
there is no "shifting" of the wage subsidy to the employee. In our endo-
genous model of wage determination, we can always show that a wage subsidy 
17a 
leads to increased urban wages, and hence, not only does the number of 
unemployed individuals increase, but the unemployment rate in the urban 
sector actually increases as a result of the wage subsidy. 
As a result of these two effects, a wage subsidy may actually reduce 
G.N.P. Indeed, a wage tax is indicated. 
In the discussion below, we shall assume that the tax revenue for 
the wage subsidy comes from a profits tax, which is not shifted at all. 
Thus the only consequences we need enquire into are those relating directly 
to the wage subsidy. 
To see how a wage subsidy, say at the rate (1-t) , changes behavior, 
we observe that the first order condition (4) is now 
(4') 
or multiplying through by w^/(1-T) , we obtain 
(31) 
Similarly 
w
 = w cp(l/l-U) •
 h C
< P M W l - U ) . (32) 
r U 1-T 
w* - W
u
(1-t) + Tq 0 3 ) 
= h
C
(U) + T q ^ ^ ^ u ) = w*(U) 
where, as before, h
C
 < 0 , dw^/dU < 0 , w* * < 0 . 
Turning to Figure 9, we observe that changing T does not affect 
the urban labor curves at all; but for each value of U , w^ increases 
when T increases, and hence the demand for labor decreases. This results 
34 
in a higher unemployment rate, a higher urban wage, and more urban unemploy-
35 
ment. Moreover, wage costs—both direct and training costs — in the urban 
17a 
FIGURE 9 
Effects of a Wage Subsidy 
17a 
sector have decreased so urban employment has also increased. 
Thus a wage subsidy does accomplish what its advocates claim—a 
higher employment rate—but it is accompanied by some deleterious side 
effects. In fact, these side effects are so strong that they imply that 
it is not desirable to have a wage subsidy. If the expected urban wage 
is equal to the rural wage (so (11) obtains) at a fixed unemployment 
rate, the opportunity cost of hiring an extra urban worker is just his 
wage: for every extra urban worker hired, 1/(1-U) workers leave the 
rural sector, and the foregone output, G /(1-U) = w , is just the nominal 
i_i u 
urban wage. But now there is the additional effect of an increase in 
the unemployment rate, which results in additional losses in output, 
although this is partially—but only partially—offset by the reduced 
hiring/training costs from the reduced turnover rates. Thus the wage 36 subsidy reduces national output. 
National output may be written 
The derivative of this with respect to T is 
for T > 0 if co(l-U) - 1 
is small. 
Indeed, optimality requires 
where if
3
 = d In L /d In w* If T* < 0 , a wage tax, not a wage sub-
u u 
sidy, is called for 
37,38 
19 
Long Run Consequences of Wage Subsidies Financed by Profits Tax 
So far, we have analyzed the short run consequences of the wage sub-
sidy. The major long run consequences with which we need be concerned are 
39 
those arising from the effects on savings. If a larger proportion of pro-
fits are saved than of wages, the profits tax-wage subsidy will decrease 
savings on two accounts: First, we have noted that the average wage e 
(w^ » w ) has increased, so that total wage payments have increased. But 
we have also noted that output has decreased. Labor receives a larger 
proportion of a smaller "pie" and profits are unambiguously reduced. Thus, 
even if savings did not depend on the distribution of income, it would be 
reduced; a fortiori, when a larger percentage of profits are saved than 
wages. This decreased savings means in turn that the rate of creation of 
jobs in the future is also reduced, 
Other Sources of Finance for Wage Subsidy 
Other schemes for raising the revenue required for the wage subsidy 
besides a profits tax have also been suggested. One of the most widely 
discussed is a general sales tax. A general sales tax is, of course, simply 
equivalent to an income tax, i.e. a uniform tax on wages and profits. Such 
a tax clearly leaves the wage determination behavior in the urban sector 
unaffected, since it does not affect any of the relative wages (urban-rural 
or intra-urban). Thus, the short run consequences are identical to those 
described in the case of the profits tax; now,however, the distributional 
impact is somewhat lessened, and hence the reduction in savings is smaller. 
If a tax on wage income only is imposed, then the net effect of the wage 
subsidy-cum-wage income tax is to reduce labor income. Indeed the reduc-
tion in labor income is greater than the reduction in national output, so 
that profits are increased: 
All of these tax-subsidy schemes have the same deleterious effects 
on output in the short run. 
20 
6, Wages and Shadow Price of Labor in the Public Sector 
There are, of course, other policy instruments available to the govern-
ment. First, even in mixed economies, a large part of the urban labor force 
is employed in the public sector. The government can decide (a) on the re-
40 
lative size of this public sector and the choice of technique (labor inten-
sity) of the public sector; (b) the location of public sector activities, 
i.e. in the rural or urban sector; and (c) the wages paid in both locations. 
Secondly, it can use other tax instruments to discourage urban unem-
ployment—e.g., urban income taxes--or to encourage the use of more labor 
intensive techniques—-e.g. tariff reductions on selected machinery, etc. 
The first set of questions is pursued in this section. The urban 
income tax is discussed briefly in the next. 
In keeping within the framework of this paper, we assume that the 
41 
capital stock in the government sector is given. Hence the production al-
ternatives facing the public sector may be described by the (short run) 
government production function: 
The government need not pay the same wage as the private sector, but may be 
constrained to pay the same wage in the urban and rural areas. The average 
wage in the urban sector is now 
G*(L®, L®) ;
8
(L
S
L
8 
v
 u' r 
where L
8
 and L
8
 are government employees in the urban and rural sector. 
,8
t
S 
w 
u (34) 
and we replace (11) by 
42 
(35) 
17a 
The quit rate from the private sector should also now be a 
function of
 w
u
/
w
^ • But if the government had the same training costs as 
the private sector and acted as a private firm (ignoring, for instance, its 
effects on the unemployment rate) then it would pay the same wage; but since 
the government should take these effects into consideration (and assuming 
that training costs per employee are no greater in this government sector 
than in the private) w® < w and there will not be labor turnover 
u u 
from the private to public (urban) sector. On the other hand, turnover 
43 rates in the urban government sector will depend on the urban wage: 
/ w
2
 w
8 
qS = qg ( D 
u ni V w w 
\ u r 
The quit rate in the government rural sector will be assumed, for simplicity, 
o 44 a 
to be fixed at q° , the result of which is that w = w 
r r r 
cr g cr 
The government wishes to choose L , L and w so as to 
u
 7
 r u 
maximize national output (subject, of course, to the free migration and 
total resource constraints). We can establish that, since there is no 
induced unemployment effect from hiring labor in the rural sector, the 
shadow price of labor in the rural public sector is the rural wage. Since 
the government urban wage is below the private urban wage, hiring one 
more worker reduces the average urban wage and hence reduces the urban 
unemployment rate. This means that the shadow price on urban government 
workers is less than the average urban wage; on the other hand, it turns 
out, under fairly weak conditions to be greater than the wage paid by the 
government in the urban sector. If the government pursues its optimal 
wage and hiring policy, there is still likely to be significant urban 
unemployment.^ 
7. Urban Income Taxes 
A proposal to get more directly at the problems arising from the urban-
rural wage differential is to impose a tax on income in the urban sector 
only. The revenues from the tax may be used, for instance, to subsidize 

17a 
AH. J L . 
l-h _ w 1-U 
X
 =
 9 In L H n w* ' 
u u 
3 In w* 5 In U 
Hence if Aw/w = 257, , U = , 1 , 9 In In v* = 1.5 , 
B la w*/d In D - .2 , then a 9% tax is indicated. 
If k > 1 , the required tax is even smaller. If k is sufficiently 
large, a urban wage subsidy rather than a wage tax is called for* For in-
stance, if k = 1.6, and all other parameters are as above, a 47% urban wage 
subsidy is called for.*^ 
S. Concluding Comments and Summary 
This paper has provided a model in which the unemployment rate as 
well as the urban wage rate are endogenous variables, The model, we would 
argue, explains at least part of the urban rural wage differentials. Al-
though we have focused on turnover costs as the "explanation" of why com-
petitive firms are willing to pay more than is necessary simply to attract 
labor, other labor costs, such as absenteeism and work "effort" are likely 
to depend on very similar considerations. The formulation of the model has 
I 
enabled us to determine clearly the effects of alternative policies on na-
tional output, urban employment, the urban unemployment rate, etc. 
The results run counter to much of the development folklore; 
(a) Although the competitive wage is likely to be greater than the wage that 
the government would set if it controlled the urban sector directly 
(but could not directly control migration) the government will still 
set the wage at a level greater than the rural wage so there would be 
urban unemployment. 
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When the government controls directly the urban sector even though 
there is urban unemployment, the shadow price of labor may be equal 
to the urban wage. 
A wage subsidy is not a good substitute for direct control of the urban 
47 
sector. The wage subsidy is always partially shifted and as a result 
it always increases the unemployment rate and may reduce national 
output. 
In a mixed economy, there is some presumption that the wage paid by the 
government in the urban sector will lie between the urban wage and the 
rural wage; the shadow price of labor in the rural sector is just the 
rural wage, but in the urban sector it is between the urban private 
sector wage and the urban public sector wage. 
A tax on wage income in the urban sector is also always partially shifted, 
increases total labor costs, and decreases the unemployment rate. Us~ 
ually, it also increases national output, but if w
u
(l-U)/w
r
 is large, 
just the opposite will occur. 
APPENDIX 
"Nbminal" and "Expected" Urban Wages and the Unemployment Rate. The 
expected wage in the urban sector differs from the nominal wage because some 
part of the time that the individual is in the urban sector he will probably 
be unemployed. The length of time unemployed depends on the model of hiring 
48 
hypothesized. The two simplest are 
(i) a random selection from the unemployment pool, which leads to 
a Poisson distribution of the period of unemployment; 
(ii) a queue model, in which the individuals are hired in order of 
time of arrival in the urban sector. 
Both are extreme cases of a more general model where the probability 
of being hired depends on the length of time in the unemployment pool. 
Initially, it takes some time to make contacts with potential employers 
and with individuals who can make contacts with employers. The longer ©ne 
i» In the city, the more extensive the network of contacts is, and hence 
the greater the probability of being hired (in any interval of time). On 
the other hand, employers may feel hesitant to hire someone who has been 
unemployed for an extensive period of time. He may have lost the requisite 
"work habits" and there may be some reason that other employers have turned 
this individual down that the employer in question may not know about. 
This leads eventually to a decrease in the probability of being hired in 
any given interval of time (see Figure 11). 
In any case the expected wage is then a function of the nominal wage 
in the urban sector, the expected duration of unemployment, and the total 
anticipated time on the job (in the urban sector): 
w D w 
„ — i L — . u
 ( A # 1 ) u D + t 1 + t q 
u u 
where D is the expected duration on the job (= 1/q) and t is the 
expected duration of unemployment. 


subsequent analysis we shall let g^ = 0 . The analysis may easily be modi-
fied for the case g > 0 . 
u 
One objection may be made to (13): it probably predicts too large 
unemployment rates for the observed magnitudes of wage differentials, For 
instance, the ratio of real wages in the two sectors are often of the order 
of magnitude 1„5 to 2?"so that the unemployment rate should be (according 
to (13)) of the order of magnitude of 33% to 50%. This overestimate may be 
accounted for by several factors, some of which we have already noted; 
(a) risk aversion: the uncertainty of obtaining a job undoubtedly deters 
a large number of individuals from coming to the urban centers, and leads 
to the actual level of unemployment corresponding to any given urban-rural 
wage ratio being smaller than predicted by equation (12). (b) Similarly, 
lack of liquidity (imperfect capital markets) results in individuals being 
unable to stay in the urban centers for extended periods of time if they 
do not get a job. (c) We have implicitly assumed that the individual has 
to be in the urban center in order to seek an urban job; in fact, individuals 
in the rural sector have contacts in the urban centers, and although their 
probability of getting an urban job is undoubtedly significantly enhanced 
by being in the urban center, it probably is still not worth their while 
to be away from the rural sector at peak demand times (harvest and planting) 
in the rural sector, (d) The exact form of (13) depended on one of the 
extreme hiring models (the queue or the Poisson model); other hiring pat-
terns would yield different equations, although other models may actually 
lead to higher unemployment rates for given wage rate ratios (as, for ex-
ample, if there is a growing labor force in the urban sector), (e) Transport 
tation costs also discourage migration, (f) There may be relative non-pecuniary 
advantages of living in the rural districts, which also will discourage migration 
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Others have advocated using a shadow wage in excess of the rural wage because 
of the distributional implications of alternative employment policies? i«e. 
since workers consume a larger fraction of their income, increasing urban 
employment will reduce savings
t
 Since the shadow price of savings is in 
excess of that for consumption, it is optical to hire woikers to a point 
where their marginal product is somewhere between the urban and sural 
wage, xn this paper we focus solely on the implications ©f wage and employ= 
nient policy for the static equilibrium, 
^Walter Elkan, Migrants and Proletarians, Oxford University Press, 1960, 
and W . Elkan, An African Labour Force, East African Studies, No. 7, Kampala, 
1955. 
3 
See in particular the more extended version of this paper, available as 
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 335, and "Alternative Theories of Wage 
Determination and Unemployment in L.D.C.'s: II. The Efficiency-Wage 
Model," Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper , 1972. 
^The fact that labor turnover is important in determining the level of 
urban wages does not rule out the possibility that institutional factors--
e.g. unions—may be important as well. 
~*A number of governments have attempted, unsuccessfully, to control migration 
directly by requiring all residents in urban areas to have work permits or 
pay taxes. When individuals are found without employment in the urban sec-
tor, they are returned to their native villages,but they return shortly to 
the city. 
throughout, we shall use the subscript u to denote variables pertaining 
to the urban sector, and the subscript r to refer to variables pertaining 
to the rural sector. 
^We focus, in other words, on the determination of the urban unskilled 
wage. The determination of wages and unemployment rates among the skilled 
raises very different issues. See, for instance, G. Fields, "Private and 
Social Returns to Investment in Education in Kenya," U. Michigan, 1972. 
F2 
% o r the same reason, it makes no difference to our short run equilibrium 
analysis whether F is constant returns to scale. 
It should be emphasized that the longer run implications of the various 
policies discussed below, e.g. a wage subsidy, may be quite different from 
the short run implications. Not only may such policies affect the level 
of savings (a point that has already received extensive attention in the 
literature) but also the intersectoral allocation of capital, 
5
These are assumed to be specific rather than general training costs. 
"°More accurately, the quit rate is a function of the wage paid by this firm 
and the entire distribution of wages paid by other firms in the urban sector. 
Since in our model, we are assuming all firms in the urban sector are iden-
tical^ in equilibrium, all firms pay the same wage, and so the distribution 
is the improper distribution at w . Nonetheless, individual firms may 
contemplate altering the wage they pay from that of the rest of the sector, 
(For a more extensive discussion of the theory of labor turnover and the 
structure of wages, see J. Stiglitz, "The Theory of Labor Turnover and 
the Wage Structure," mimeo, 1973.) We assume in this paper that 
the only means of affecting the turnover rate is to lower the wage. There 
are other instruments available, e.g, seniority pay but these are sufficiently 
weak to leave a significant amount of turnover to be affected by wage 
leveIs, 
eassume, in other words, that the substitution effect of a higher urban-
rural wage differential in discouraging labor turnover is more important than 
any possible "income effect." If this is not the case, then q
2
 > 0 (e.g. 
if individuals come to the urban sector to accumulate a fixed amount of savings). 
Whether q
?
 < 0 does not affect our qualitative results, as the reader can 
check for himself. 
12 
Thishasbeen particularly emphasized in the work of Elkan, op. cit. 
13 . 
The second order condition requires 
q
l l
 q
1 2
 q
2 2 
+ 2 ~ ~ + -4r > 0 . 
—2 w w 2 
w u r w 
u r 
1 4
That is, both direct labor costs and training costs are non regressive 
factors. 
1 5
Clearly, (2a) and (2c) imply (2b). 
17a 
The relationship between (2a)-(2d) and (7) follows immediately 
upon differentiation of (4). (2b) will clearly be satisfied if an 
increase in the urban-rural wage differential decreases the sensitivity 
of quit rates to Intra-urban wage differentials (q., > 0) and q is 
convex (so q
2 2
 > 0 ). Similarly, (2d) is satisfied if, at higher 
unemployment rates, quit rates respond less to wage differentials, both 
within the urban sector and between the urban and rural sectors. 
17 
(2a) and (2b) imply that' 
d la 0 
d In w 
q
2 
1 + 
2 w 
w u r 
u 
q
12 , ^22 
w w 2 
u r w 
r 
< 1 
2 
w 
u 
In principle, the firm is interested in maximizing the discounted cash 
flow, where presumably the discount rate is equal to the rate of interest. 
The requisite modifications in (9) are straightforward; their main effect 
is simply to complicate the algebra, 
19 
See Appendix. 
20 
See Appendix, p. Ai. 
21 
If, for instance, CO® is constant, so 
w 1-U 
r 
then (11a) and (lib) both assert that k > 1 . 
22 
J.E. Stiglitz, "Rural-Urban Migration, Surplus Labor, and the Relationship 
between Urban and Rural Wages," E. Africa Econ. Rev., December 1969. I 
argued there that the allocation of labor between the sectors depends on, 
among other things, the pattern of land ownership (whether owned privately 
or communally) and arrangements for "sharing" among members of a community. 
I argued there that in the African context, probably the most reasonable 
assumptions (e.g. if workers in the rural sector get paid their marginal 
product, and if they leave the rural sector, they keep their land there and 
so still earn "rents" on it. Indeed the common pattern in the African 
situation is that some members of the family remain in the rural sector, 
working the land, and some migrate temporarily to the urban sector. Thus 
in deciding whether to migrate or not, they need only look at their mar-
ginal product in the rural sector in comparison with their expected income 
17a 
in the urban sector) yielded the result that labor allocated itself so 
that the marginal productivity of labor in the rural sector equalled the 
expected urban wage (ignoring risk aversion and transportation costs). 
Other circumstances were delineated where labor allocated itself so that 
the average productivity of labor in the rural sector equalled the ex-
pected urban wage. (In particular, this required the absence of a 
landless rural laboring class receiving as a wage its marginal product, 
and communal ownership of land, with the further stipulation that when 
individuals left the rural area they no longer received any returns from 
the land. These assumptions are clearly not satisfied in most African 
economies.) For most of the analysis, it makes little difference whether 
we work with the marginal or average product hypothesis. 
2 3
F o r most of the ensuing analysis, it is the restriction embodied in (18) 
and not the restrictions embodied in (7) or (2b-d) that is crucial. The relation 
ship between the two can easily be seen by taking the derivative of (17) 
with respect to U and comparing the resulting expression with (2b) 
and (2d). 
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Let cd[ (1/1~U), a ] = w /w where a is a shift parameter. Let © < 0 . Then 
u r T Q ; 
( j 4 = "
T ( q i 2 +
 ^
 + q
2
>C?a > 0 
using (2c). Similarly 
m j -
 =
 "
T ( q
l 2
 + q
2fP
) c D
a >
 0 
25 
Provided it is not "Pigou labor saving, " i.e. provided the elasticity of 
substitution is sufficiently great. 
Under the same conditions given above, footnote 25. 
27 
Throughout the remainder of the paper we shall use superscript c to 
refer to functions, values of variables, etc. in the competitive market 
solution, and a superscript o for the optimal solution. 
2 8
Upon rewriting (23) using (11) we obtain w°(U) = h°(U) . 
29 
If (13) is true, a' = 1 , and we are left with only the direct 
unemployment effect and the intra-urban competition effect. 
30" 
We are considering the consequences to the equilibrium of a shift in the 
h(U) function; let h be a function of a shift parameter a : h(U,a) , 
c o where h(U, a) = ah + (l-a)h . Then equilibrium requires 
L 
L (W (u, a ) ) / . . x 
l -u ' r U ( l / 1 - U ) ' ~ L 
L" L' 
M u _r , 
du _ i -u 3a • cd a 
d a
 L' * 7 h ~ " _Ji_ + T »/ -2. h ffl* \ • u 
1-U 3U + r U • 2 „ .2 ) + ~ ~2 \ CO (1-U) J (1-U) 
•J _ h 
3a a 
dw I ° 
J i = h + h 4H t. y . r , _J!iL__ . T . + T 
da a + t l u da h a
 L
u (I-U)CD L r ~ +
 L
u ' > 
' w 
denotes "is of the same sign as.") 
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For reasonable values of the parameters, T* appears to be small, 
c o 
If U = .2 , " ^ "
 h
 ^ = .4 (the competitive wage is 40% too 
h°(U) 
d
 3 In w* 
high), T]^  = 2 and - ^ .,_ —rp = .2 (a one percent increase in unemploy-
ment is associated with a .2 percent decline in total labor costs 
per effective worker), and co(l-U) = 1.2 , then T* = -.4% . 
39 
If the training costs were general rather than specific, there would 
be some advantages to increased employment in providing a more educated 
labor force. 
40 
We assume, however, that the government is restrained from taking direct 
control of the "private sector;" if it can do that, we are in the situation 
described in Section 4 
41 
If it were variable, it would simply give us two additional first order 
conditions. The results on optimal labor allocation and wage setting in 
the government sector are not affected by this assumption. 
42 
This assumes in effect that it is the agricultural workers who migrate, since 
< w
8
 (otherwise, the government cannot attract workers), 
43 
These functions are meant simply to be a convenient simplification capturing 
the "first order effects" of a process which is clearly far more complicated; 
for instance, now that we have introduced a difference of wages in the urban 
sector, it is clearly possible for individuals to accept a government urban 
job and continue to seek employment in the private urban sector. This clearly 
has some effect on w ^ , which (35) does not probably properly capture. 
44 g g 
We could let q^ be a function of relative wages as well; increasing w° 
reduces labor turnover. If there is no government budgetary constraint this 
is the only effect, so w§ is raised to the point when the quit rate is un-
Qr 
affected by further increases in w . J
 r 
45 . 
it can be shown that under fairly weak assumptions (e.g. an increase in 
the unemployment rate reduces turnover) 
U > 
1 + 
F8 
Assume, for instance, L^ = L® , 71^ = 2 , and that (-3 In w*/3 In U) = ,2 
(so, e^g. an increase in the unemployment rate from 20 to 21% would reduce 
labor costs by 1%), Then 
i.e. there is still a fairly high unemployment rate. 
r
^It should be emphasized that although we have chosen what may be regarded as 
"reasonable" values of the parameter, these are only meant to be illustra-
tive, 
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'Within the limited bounds of our analysis, we are ignoring the dynamic ef-
fects, the advantages of individual entrepreneurship, etc. All of this 
is to s?.y that although in our model direct controls are better than in-
direct controls, I would hardly use this as a basis for arguing that the 
government should control the urban sector directly. 
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Harris and Todaro have considered still a different model in which individuals 
go to the hiring hall every day; the probability of being selected for work 
is just 1°U , so the expected wage is w (1°U) . Remarkably enough, this 
is exactly the result yielded by the two models below when there is no growth. 
See J.E. Harris and M. Todaro, "Migration, Unemployment and Development; A 
Two-Sector Analysis," AER
y
 1970, 
4 9
I t may have been noted that here as in (A.l) we use the same symbols for ^ 
"duration in the urban sector" as we used earlier for "duration on the job. 
Although this makes sense in the context of our simplified model, since in 
the equilibrium all firms are identical and pay the same wage, so there is 
in equilibrium no intra-firm movement of labor in the urban sector, it should 
be emphasized that this is not an essential assumption in the analysis. 
We could have written (A.l) replacing q with q where q is the rate 
of leaving the urban sector, and the expression we derive below (A.4) womld 
be unaffected. 
5
°If the urban sector is growing at the rate g^ , we have 
0 g t 
qL f e
 U
 - UN u u 
u 
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When substituted into (A.l) this yields an expression slightly different 
from (A.4). 
"'These probably exaggerate real wage differentials among unskilled laborers; re-
lative prices differ markedly, so there is a serious index number problem, 
52 
This is offset to some extent by the greater variability of agricultural income. 
